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Analysis Advance Access originally published online on July 8, 2009
Analysis 2009 69(4):661-668; doi:10.1093/analys/anp094
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© The Authors 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Higher-order thought and pathological self: the case of somatoparaphrenia

Caleb Liang

National Taiwan University No. 1, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Road Taipei, Taiwan yiliang@ntu.edu.tw

Timothy Lane1

The Humanities Center National Chengchi University Bai Nian Building N. 330410 N. 64, Section 2, ZhiNan Road Taipei, Taiwan tlan@nccu.edu.tw

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below.


   1. Introduction
 
Somatoparaphrenia, a pathology of self, is philosophically perplexing. It poses a significant challenge for theories of consciousness, including David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory, which holds that HOTs are scientific posits in a theory that aims for explanatory adequacy. In a recent series of papers Rosenthal (e.g. 2005: 341) has employed the HOT theory as part of an attempt to explain ‘our sense of having a unified consciousness’, a ‘sense’ which he understands as the ‘compelling intuition’ that we have a single self. He develops his explanation in terms of an immunity-to-error principle (thin immunity), which holds that we are immune to error in certain restricted judgements concerning self. After presenting Rosenthal's theory in §2, in §3 we argue that it fails to explain somatoparaphrenia, a pathology in which mental states can be conscious even when they are represented as belonging to someone other than self. We discuss . . . [Full Text of this Article]


   2. HOT, self and the thin immunity principle
 

   3. Violation of the thin immunity principle by a pathological self
 

   4. Possible defences of HOT and TIP
 

   5. Conclusion
 

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