Analysis Advance Access originally published online on July 8, 2009
Analysis 2009 69(4):650-653; doi:10.1093/analys/anp101
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
Why counterpart theory and modal realism are incompatible
The University of New Orleans Louisiana, USA jstone@uno.edu
| The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. |
I find a lost wallet containing the owner's address and a lot of cash. Shall I keep it or return it? Suppose I have the liberty of indifference: whatever I do, I could have done otherwise. Indeed, part of what is meant in saying I act freely is that either way what I do is up to me. And let's allow this liberty requires that my choice is not a logical consequence of the past and natural laws. If I return the wallet, I could have kept it without violating a law of nature or changing the past. Let's call this situation S (where the liberty of indifference is part of S). Suppose I return the wallet.
Others are also in S: free people find lost wallets every day. Each of us can freely return the wallet we find. It doesnt follow immediately that we can all return it, however.