Analysis Advance Access originally published online on July 9, 2009
Analysis 2009 69(4):643-649; doi:10.1093/analys/anp096
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© The Authors 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
Properties, possibilia and contingent second-order predication
University of Leeds Leeds LS2 9JT, UK j.w.melia@leeds.ac.uk phl5dw@leeds.ac.uk
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| 1. The problem |
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Lewis identifies the monadic property being F with the set of all actual and possible Fs; the dyadic relation R is identified with the set of actual and possible pairs of things that are related by R; and so on (1986: 50–69).1 Egan has argued that the fact that some properties have some of their (second-order) properties contingently leads to trouble:
Let @ be the actual world, in which being green is [someone's] favourite property, and let w be a world in which being green is [nobody's] favourite property. Since being green is somebody's favourite property in @, it must be a member of ... being somebody's favourite property. Since being green is not anybody's favourite property in w, it must not be a member of being somebody's favourite property. Contradiction. (Egan 2001: 50–51)Egan suggests identifying properties with functions from worlds to extensions. However,
| 2. On being someone's favourite property |
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| 3. On being Fred's favourite property |
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| 4. A final dilemma |
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