Analysis Advance Access published online on November 1, 2009
Analysis, doi:10.1093/analys/anp147
© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
Inhabiting the Space of Reasoning
University of Cape Town Rondebosch 7701, Cape Town South Africa jeremy.wanderer@uct.ac.za
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Recent accounts of differing contemporary approaches to mind and language portray them as engaged in a kind of Homeric struggle between two warring camps, neo-Cartesian and neo-Pragmatist.1 One central battlefront concerns the potential autonomy of semantics from pragmatics. To say that semantics is potentially autonomous from pragmatics is to allow that there can be a semantic theory that makes no potential contribution to pragmatic theory. Neo-Cartesians affirm, whilst neo-Pragmatists deny, the potential autonomy of semantics from pragmatics. A Homeric struggle calls for heroes; heroes in the neo-Pragmatist camp are said to include Dummett, Brandom, Rorty, McDowell, Davidson and (possibly) Sellars, whilst heroes in the neo-Cartesian camp are said to include Dretske, Fodor and Lepore. Here we have a basic divide in contemporary philosophy of language, one that John Macfarlane has dubbed as perhaps the most significant divide of all.2
The distinction between pragmatics and semantics used here is the distinction
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