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Analysis Advance Access published online on September 28, 2009
Analysis, doi:10.1093/analys/anp144
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

The Case for Contexualism1

Peter Baumann

Swarthmore College Swarthmore, PA 19081, USA pbauman1@swarthmore.edu

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below.

Ann and Fred are at a train station. They both happen to wonder whether the incoming train will stop at Junction-City. Ann is just curious while Fred badly needs to get to Junction-City as soon as possible. As the train rolls in and comes to a stop, they both ask Hank, a passenger on the train who looks reliable. Hank truly answers that he takes this train quite often and that it does stop at Junction-City. Does Hank know that the train will stop at Junction-City (Fantl and McGrath 2002)?

According to a traditional view, whether Hank knows this depends on whether he has a true belief about it and also meets some further epistemic standards. Is his belief based on evidence? Has it been acquired in a reliable way? Whatever the details about epistemic standards are, our subject needs to meet them in order to count as a . . . [Full Text of this Article]


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