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Analysis Advance Access published online on September 28, 2009
Analysis, doi:10.1093/analys/anp138
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Refutation by elimination

John Turri

Huron University College London, Ontario N6G 1H3, Canada john.turri@gmail.com

The first 10% of the full text of this article appears below.

This article refutes two important and influential views in one fell stroke. The first is G.E. Moore's view that assertions of the form ‘Q but I don’t believe that Q’ are inherently absurd. The second is Gareth Evans's view that justification to assert Q entails justification to assert that you believe Q. Both views run aground the possibility of being justified in accepting eliminativism about belief. A corollary is that a principle recently defended by John Williams is also false, namely, that justification to believe Q entails justification to believe that you believe Q.


   1. Moore's paradox
 
You might be so absorbed in this article that you do not notice that it is raining. It could be raining even though you do not believe that it is raining. If I notice this is happening to you, . . . [Full Text of this Article]


   2. Evans's principle
 

   3. Elimination
 

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