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Analysis Advance Access published online on October 5, 2009
Analysis, doi:10.1093/analys/anp136
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Di Nucci on the Simple View

Hugh J. McCann

Texas A&M University College Station, TX 77843-4237, USA h-mccann@tamu.edu

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below.

What Michael Bratman (1987) has called the Simple View of the relation between intentional action and intending states that an action A is intentional only if, in performing it, the agent intended to A. This principle has been defended by me (McCann 1986, 1991), Adams (1986) and Sverdlik (1996), as well as others. It is rejected by Bratman (1987), and by Ezio Di Nucci in a recent contribution to Analysis (2009). I want to argue here that Di Nucci fails to make his case. I will deal with his arguments only as they address my own views on the matter, but I think that what I have to say is largely consistent with what the other defenders of the Simple View might say.

1. Central to the discussion of the Simple View have been several examples . . . [Full Text of this Article]


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