Analysis Advance Access published online on October 27, 2009
Analysis, doi:10.1093/analys/anp135
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Fatalism and the necessity of the present: reply to Campbell
University of Nottingham Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK apxrl2@nottingham.ac.uk
| The first 10% of the full text of this article appears below. |
| 1. Introduction |
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Joseph Keim Campbell (2007) has argued that the reliance of Peter van Inwagen's (1983) Third Argument for Incompatibilism (TA) on the existence of a remote past bears on the import of its conclusion: since the existence of a remote past is only a contingent feature of our world, TA fails to prove that the free will thesis is necessarily incompatible with determinism. In response, I have proposed a new version of the Third Argument (RTA), which – by exploiting and developing further Anthony Bruckner's (2008) retooled version of TA – does not rely on the existence of either a remote or a recent
| 2. Campbell's argument |
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| 3. The ability to do otherwise (before it is too late) |
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