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Analysis Advance Access published online on October 5, 2009
Analysis, doi:10.1093/analys/anp133
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Descriptions and unknowability

Jan Heylen

K.U. Leuven Dekenstraat 2 – bus 03220 3000 Leuven, Belgium jan.heylen@hiw.kuleuven.be

The first 10% of the full text of this article appears below.

In a recent paper Horsten (2009) embarked on a journey along the limits of the domain of the unknowable. Rather than knowability simpliciter, he considered a priori knowability, and by the latter he meant absolute provability, i.e. provability that is not relativized to a formal system. (Henceforth, when I speak about ‘provability’ I mean ‘absolute provability’.) He presented an argument for the conclusion that it is not absolutely provable that there is a natural number of which it is true but absolutely unprovable that it has a certain property. Informally glossed, Horsten's argument runs as follows:

Suppose, for a reductio, that there exists a . . . [Full Text of this Article]


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