Analysis Advance Access published online on October 7, 2009
Analysis, doi:10.1093/analys/anp129
© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
A vindication of a refutation of global scepticism, a refutation of global perceptual scepticism and a refutation of global existential scepticism
Birkbeck College University of London Malet Street, Bloomsbury London WC1E 7HX, UK k.gemes@bbk.ac.uk
School of Humanities University of Southampton Southampton S017 1BJ, UK k.gemes@soton.ac.uk
| The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. |
Gemes (2009) argued that, given that I believe that I have hands and I believe that it is not the case that I have a hand with a wart on it, it must be the case that at least one of my experience-based beliefs (EBBs) is true. This follows since the contradictions of those two propositions believed by me are jointly inconsistent. Gemes (2009) concluded that this refutes the sceptical claim that it is possible that all one's EBBs are false. The first section of this article addresses some objections to the argument of Gemes (2009). The second section develops new counter-examples to the claim that it is possible that all one's EBBs are false, and then argues that they are also counter-examples to the claim that it is possible that all one's direct, that is, perceptual, EBBs are false. The third section presents
| 1. Replies to some objections |
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| 2. A new counter-example to global scepticism and global perceptual scepticism |
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| 3. Counter-examples to global existential scepticism |
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