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Analysis Advance Access published online on October 27, 2009
Analysis, doi:10.1093/analys/anp128
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Incompatibilism and fatalism: reply to Loss

Joseph K. Campbell

Washington State University Pullman, WA 99164-5130, USA josephc@wsu.edu

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below.


   1. Introduction
 
In a recent paper (Campbell 2007), I critique two formal versions of the consequence argument: the first argument (van Inwagen 1975; 1983: 68–78) and the third argument (van Inwagen 1983: 93–105; 2000). Previously (Campbell 2008: 269), I noted that the first and third arguments depend on two different kinds of principle. Grounding principles note our lack of ability in rendering certain types of true propositions false. Presumably, we are unable to render the laws of nature false and we are equally unable to render true propositions about the past false. Given determinism, these inabilities are then passed onto all other true propositions via transfer principles like van Inwagen's (β). I am not suggesting that all versions of the consequence argument share this structure, just that the first and third arguments have this structure.

Here is my criticism (Campbell 2007). Incompatibilism holds that determinism is incompatible . . . [Full Text of this Article]


   2. Oscillating Adam and weak incompatibilism
 

   3. Reply to Loss
 

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Fatalism and the necessity of the present: reply to Campbell
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Analysis 2009 10.1093/analys/anp135. [Extract] [Full Text]