Analysis Advance Access published online on September 24, 2009
Analysis, doi:10.1093/analys/anp125
© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
Factivity and contextualism
Swarthmore College Swarthmore, PA 19081, USA pbauman1@swarthmore.edu
| The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. |
I recently argued (Baumann 2008) that there is a factivity problem for epistemic contextualism, which suggests that contextualism is inconsistent (cf. also Brendel (2005) and Wright (2005)). A similar problem arises for subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) (cf. Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005) posing a similar threat of inconsistency (cf. Brueckner 2005: 317; Hawthorne 2004: 159–60; Wright 2005: 243–44). Recently, Anthony Brueckner and Christopher T. Buford have argued (2009) that in both cases the problem is only apparent. In this article, I defend the view that they are wrong about this, and that there is, indeed, a serious problem for contextualism. I will start with a presentation of the initial problem for contextualism and then discuss Brueckner's and Buford's reply. I will neither go into what I take to be the way out of the problem for contextualism (cf. Baumann 2008: 
4–5)
| 1. The problem |
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| 2. The apparent dissolution of the problem |
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| 3. Why the problem remains |
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| 4. Some further problems with Brueckner's and Buford's view |
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| 5. Conclusion |
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