Skip Navigation



Analysis Advance Access published online on September 30, 2009
Analysis, doi:10.1093/analys/anp123
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Armour-Garb, B.
Right arrow Articles by Woodbridge, J. A.
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Authors 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Truthmakers, paradox and plausibility

Bradley Armour-Garb

The University at Albany – SUNY Albany, NY 12159, USA armrgrb@albany.edu

James A. Woodbridge

University of Nevada Las Vegas Las Vegas, NV 89154-5028, USA woodbri3@unlv.edu

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below.

In a series of articles in this journal, Dan López De Sa and Elia Zardini (2006, 2007) (forthwith ‘LSZ’) have argued that several theorists have recently employed instances of paradoxical reasoning, while failing to see its problematic nature because it does not immediately (or obviously) yield inconsistency. In contrast, LSZ claim that resultant inconsistency is not a necessary condition for paradoxicality. According to them (2007: 246), ‘[w]hat really seems to be the essence [of the notion of ‘paradox’] is that, despite the apparent validity of the argument, the premises do not rationally support the conclusion’. It is our contention here that, even given their broader understanding of paradox, LSZ's arguments fail to undermine the instances of reasoning they attack, either because they fail to see everything that is at work in that reasoning, or because they misunderstand what it is that the reasoning aims to show.

. . . [Full Text of this Article]


   1. Sorensen-style epistemicism
 

   2. Sorensen on ungrounded sentences
 

   3. Sorensen and the ‘no-no’
 

   4. LSZ's attack on Sorensen
 

   5. Reply to LSZ on behalf of Sorensen
 

   6. LSZ, Sorensen and epistemic openness
 

   7. Further paradoxes
 

   8. Revenge for Sorensen
 

   9. Conclusions
 

Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?