Analysis 2009 69(4):714-721; doi:10.1093/analys/anp108
The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
Colour, Emotion and Objectivity
Joshua Gert
Florida State University 151 Dodd Hall, Tallahassee FL, 32306, USA jgert@fsu.edu
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1. Introduction
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The Emotional Construction of Morals is a
tour de force that
combines empirical data and philosophical argument in an impressively
coherent way. Certainly it resists any sweeping assessment;
a mere presentation of the principal lines of argument would
itself take the space of an article. Also, and despite its systematic
structure, I do not think Prinz's view places decisive weight
on any small number of points. Consequently, I do not think
it can be refuted in any wholesale way. Nevertheless, I often
find myself in very sharp disagreement with Prinz. What I would
like to do in this article, therefore, is to focus on what seem
to be some broad issues of perspective, and see if I can convince
readers that taking a slightly different perspective on certain
matters might undermine the apparent force of much of what he
has to say. In particular, I will focus on the analogy
. . . [Full Text of this Article]
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2. Objectivity and Disagreement
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3. Innateness
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4. Moral Illusions
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5. Conclusion
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