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Analysis Advance Access originally published online on July 9, 2009
Analysis 2009 69(4):689-694; doi:10.1093/analys/anp095
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© The Authors 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Linguistic and metalinguistic intuitions in the philosophy of language

Edouard Machery

Department of History and Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh 1017CL Pittsburgh PA 15260 USA machery@pitt.edu

Christopher Y. Olivola

Department of Psychology Princeton University Green Hall Princeton NJ 08540 colivola@princeton.edu

Molly De Blanc

Department of History and Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh 1017CL Pittsburgh PA 15260 USA mjd32@pitt.edu

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Machery et al. (2004) reported some preliminary evidence that intuitions about reference vary within and across cultures, and they argued that if real, such variation would have significant philosophical implications (see also Mallon et al. 2009). In a recent article, Genoveva Martí (2009) argues that the type of intuitions examined by Machery and colleagues (‘metalinguistic intuitions’) is evidentially irrelevant for identifying the correct theory of reference, and she concludes that the variation in the relevant intuitions about reference within and across cultures has not been established.

To substantiate this criticism, Martí draws a distinction between two types of intuitions: metalinguistic intuitions and what we will call ‘linguistic’ intuitions. Metalinguistic intuitions are judgements about the semantic properties of mentioned words (e.g. their reference), while, if we understand Martí correctly, linguistic intuitions are judgements about the individuals (substances, classes, etc.) described in the actual and possible cases . . . [Full Text of this Article]


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