Analysis Advance Access originally published online on July 2, 2009
Analysis 2009 69(4):684-688; doi:10.1093/analys/anp090
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
Truth-conditions and the nature of truth: re-solving mixed conjunctions
University College Dublin Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland douglas.edwards@ucd.ie
| The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. |
Alethic pluralism, on one version of the view (Wright 1992, 2003), is the idea that truth is to be identified with different properties in different domains of discourse.1 Whilst we operate with a univocal concept of truth, and a uniform truth predicate, the thought is that the truth property changes from one domain to the next. So the truth property for talk about the nature and state of the material world (perhaps correspondence to fact) may be different from the truth property for moral discourse (perhaps coherence or superassertibility).
Tappolet (2000) challenged alethic pluralism by asking how it can account for the truth of mixed compounds, such as a mixed conjunction like this cat is wet and funny, where each of the conjuncts are from different domains of discourse, and thus assessable in terms of different truth properties. She argues that the alethic pluralist is left
| 1. A proliferation of truth properties? |
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| 2. Truth properties and truth-conditions |
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| 3. Re-solving mixed conjunctions and countering generic truth |
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| 4. Conclusion |
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